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THE ROLE OF WORKPLACE CULTURE EVIDENCE IN
HOSTILE WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LITIGATION: DOES TITLE VII MEAN NEW
MANAGEMENT OR JUST BUSINESS AS USUAL?
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a woman working for a traditionally male-
dominated mining company.1  Perhaps, you became a miner because it
offered a better salary than other available positions, or because the
job appealed to you for any number of other reasons.  Now suppose
that the men in the mining company do not particularly enjoy working
alongside women.2  As a result, they often make degrading comments
about women in general, and sometimes they direct gender-biased in-
sults directly at you.3  Furthermore, posters of nude women pervade
the working environment and a male co-worker once even grabbed
and kissed you.4  Eventually, you complain to your employer about this
intolerable situation.  At this point, you might believe that if your em-
ployer refuses to take corrective steps you have enough evidence to
quit and sue your employer for maintaining a workplace that is hostile
to women in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.5
You may find, however, that not all courts would agree with you.
Some courts explicitly or implicitly conclude that a litigant cannot sus-
tain a cause of action for hostile workplace environment sexual harass-
ment if he or she willingly enters a working environment where
sexually-tinged obscenities, gender-biased commentary, or sometimes
even pornography and unwanted sexual touching have been tradition-
1. See Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).  The hypo-
thetical fact pattern in this introduction is largely based on Jensen.  In Jensen, female
miners were subjected to verbal harassment, unwanted sexual touching and porno-
graphic materials. Although a district court judge found that the female miners were
subjected to actionable sexual harassment, a district court special master found that the
mining company’s liability should be limited because abusive behavior towards women
was historically accepted within the mining industry.  The circuit court reversed and
found that the employer’s liability was emphasized, not lessened, by the fact that the




5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1994). See infra text accompanying notes
12-13.
349
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ally perceived as an “accepted” part of the workplace culture.6   These
courts would say that a female miner must endure behavior that might
be actionable sexual harassment in another context, simply because of
its prevalence in the mining industry.
Other courts have declined to allow workplace cultures to dictate
whether or not objectionable behavior constitutes actionable hostile
workplace sexual harassment.7  These courts consider the impact that
6. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (finding that
vulgarity, sexual innuendo and pornography are a part of some work environments and
cannot be considered sexual harassment); Gross v. Burgraff Construction Co., 53 F.3d
1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that profanity and vulgarity are accepted as part of
the construction industry and not perceived as harassment); Hosey v. McDonald’s
Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 201 (D. Md. 1996), aff’d., 113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that female employee did not sexually harass male co-worker by making
lewd comments since it was common for teenagers in this work environment to use
unprofessional language when asking for dates, and female employee’s touching of
plaintiff’s buttocks was not severe enough to amount to harassment); Halpert v. Wer-
theim and Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that refer-
ences to sexual activity and male and female genitalia were an accepted part of the
security trading firm environment and did not constitute sexual harassment);  Reynolds
v. Atlantic City Convention Authority, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, at 18
(1990), aff’d, 925 F.2d 419 (3rd Cir. 1991) (“to evaluate the impact on a reasonable
person of the obscene gestures made by a single co-worker and the obscene remarks
made by two other co-workers, we must discount the impact of those obscenities in an
atmosphere otherwise pervaded by obscenity.”); Connor v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l,
Inc., 227 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) (referring to district court’s ruling that alleged inci-
dents of sexual harassment were not actionable because they occurred in the “rugged
environment” of a machine shop); Smith v Sheahan, No. 95-C-7203, 1997 U.S Dist.
Lexis 20753, at 23 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1997), rev’d, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999) (ruling
that violence was common amongst co-workers in the jail setting and that no sexual
harassment occurred when a male employee physically assaulted a female co-worker,
called her a “bitch” and threatened to “fuck [her] up”); Jensen, 130 F.2d  at 1292 (refer-
ring to special master’s finding that the traditional prevalence of verbal, physical and
visual sexual harassment in the workplace mitigated the employer’s liability).
7. See, e.g., Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting a “merely juvenile behavior defense” that would have rein-
forced gender-biased, prevailing workplace norms and holding that the conduct had to
be judged from the female victim’s perspective);  Bennett v. NYC Dept. of Corrections,
705 F. Supp. 979, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling that a fact-finder could conclude that the
plaintiff reasonably regarded various incidents of abuse as sexual harassment even
though they occurred in a harsh prison environment because “there are limits beyond
which the atmosphere even in a prison may not be allowed to deteriorate”);  Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff stated a valid Title VII claim when she
asserted that she was subjected to vulgar sexual comments and that her workplace was
filled with such sexual slurs);  Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir.
1997) (pervasive gender discrimination that has been traditionally accepted within an
industry underscores, rather than mitigates, an employer’s culpability); Andrews v. City
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workplace cultures could reasonably have on individuals.8  Following
this approach, even if explicit profanity and pornography are tradition-
ally accepted within the mining industry, if a reasonable woman could
still regard the behavior as discriminatory sexual harassment, the
courts will not provide blanket protection to the workplace culture.9
This Note rejects the notion that courts should require employees
to endure traditionally abusive workplace environments without con-
sidering whether the workplace culture may reasonably be considered
discriminatory.  For instance, the fact that anti-female behavior might
be generally accepted within the mining industry or within a particular
mining company, does not preclude a woman from fairly regarding
the behavior as discriminatory sexual harassment that violates Title VII
and negatively impacts both her psyche and job performance.10  In
fact, rather than insulate companies from liability, evidence that a
workplace culture is abusive to either men or women as a class actually
supports a plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim and can warrant in-
creased damage awards.11
Part I of this Note will provide background information on sex
discrimination law in the sexual harassment context.  Part II will ex-
amine how courts have considered workplace culture evidence when
analyzing hostile workplace sexual harassment claims.  Finally, Part III
will suggest how evidence of an allegedly abusive and discriminatory
workplace culture can be used to help prove a sexual harassment claim
and justify increased damage awards.
of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d. Cir. 1990) (holding that conduct alleged to be
sexual harrassment must be viewed from the reasonable woman’s perspective); Connor
v. Schrader- Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) (overturning district
court’s ruling that alleged incidents of sexual harassment were not actionable because
they occurred in the “rugged environment” of a machine shop); Smith v. Sheahan, 189
F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an employee does not assume the risk of
discriminatory conduct simply by choosing to work in an environment where discrimi-
natory behavior is prevalent).
8. See cases cited supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that the perspective of the victim must be considered in sexual
harassment litigation).
10. See Jensen, 130 F.3d at 1304 (“it should be obvious that the callous pattern and
practice of sexual harassment engaged in by Eveleth Mines inevitably destroyed the self-
esteem of the working women exposed to it”).
11. See infra notes 134, 137 & 141.
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I. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits sex-based employ-
ment discrimination.12  The relevant portion of Title VII provides:  “It
shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such individual’s . . . sex.”13 With little legis-
lative history to act as a guide, Congress left the administration and
interpretation of Title VII to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and the courts.14
Both the EEOC and the courts have recognized sexual harassment
in employment situations as a form of sex-based employment discrimi-
nation because sexual harassment tends to prevent victimized employ-
ees from functioning properly in the workplace.15 Sexual harassment
has been classified into two types: (1) quid pro quo harassment and (2)
hostile workplace environment harassment.16 Quid pro quo harassment
occurs when an employer or supervisor takes tangible employment ac-
tion against an employee because of the employee’s unwillingness to
provide sexual favors.17 For example, a supervisor may not terminate
an employee, or withhold a promotion, because an employee refuses
to accede to the supervisor’s sexual advances.
Even if a supervisor or employer takes no adverse employment ac-
tion, the EEOC and the courts have recognized that a workplace envi-
ronment which is hostile to a particular gender violates Title VII.18
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1994).
13. Id.
14. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986). The opinion refers
to the EEOC as the agency charged with enforcing Title VII and recognizes that EEOC
sexual harassment guidelines act as persuasive, but not controlling, authority for judi-
cial interpretations of Title VII.  Additionally, the opinion notes that there is little legis-
lative history to guide the EEOC and courts in interpreting Title VII.
15. Id. at 63-68 (both the courts and the EEOC recognize sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination); infra note 121.
16. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 65; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth 524 U.S. 742, 751
(1998); infra note 17.
17. See Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1852 (D.N.J. 1990) (quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs “when submission to or
rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting plaintiff”).
18. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-67 (holding that sexual harassment can be actiona-
ble even if the victimized employee does not suffer a tangible loss of an economic na-
ture, such as a salary reduction).
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Hostile workplace environment sexual harassment claims can arise
when an employee is subjected to severe, gender-biased abuse in the
workplace.19 The abuse can occur at the hands of employers, supervi-
sors or other co-workers, and unlike a quid pro quo claim, the employee
need not show that he or she suffered a tangible, or economic loss
because of the harassment.20
Hostile workplace environment sexual harassment claims have proven
to be problematic for both courts and litigants.21  Courts have found it
impossible to establish a bright line test to separate actionable sexual
harassment from merely annoying behavior.22  Employers and victims
alike are often left wondering exactly what behavior rises to the level of
actionable hostile workplace harassment.23
The EEOC has issued guidelines on sexual harassment in an effort
to educate victims and provide employers with information needed to
develop effective anti-harassment policies.24  Although the EEOC
guidelines are considered merely persuasive authority, they have given
the courts a starting point for defining hostile workplace environment
sexual harassment.25 Nevertheless, rather than adopt the EEOC’s in-
terpretation of Title VII verbatim, the courts have established their
own requirements for stating a valid hostile workplace environment
19. See id. (sexual harassment which is severe enough to create a hostile working
environment for one sex is actionable).
20. See id. at 57; Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (showing of
economic harm not necessary to prove a sexual harassment claim); see also Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
21. See Estelle D. Franklin, Article: Maneuvering Through The Labyrinth: The Em-
ployer’s Paradox in responding to Hostile Workplace Environment Sexual Harassment – A Pro-
posed Way Out, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1524-26 (1999).
22. “The extreme boundaries [of actionable conduct] are defined: on one side,
‘merely’ offensive conduct is not actionable; on the other side, psychologically debilitat-
ing conduct is actionable.  What is sufficient between those two points, however, is any-
body’s guess.”  Franklin, supra note 21, at 1535.
23. See id. at 1538.
24. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a).  The
Guidelines indicate that “Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of
Title VII.  Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”
25. See supra note 14.
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claim.26  Although variations exist, most courts agree that the rule is
roughly comprised of the elements discussed in the case of Henson v.
City of Dundee.27  To state an actionable hostile workplace environment
sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must show the following:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected class;  (2) the
employee was subject to harassment, that is, unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harass-
ment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment, that is, the
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment; and (5) a basis for imputing liabil-
ity to the employer.28
A plaintiff must additionally prove that he or she found the environ-
ment subjectively offensive and show that an objective person would
come to the same conclusion.29  Although this doctrinal rule has
helped to focus the decision-making process of the courts, it has by no
means resolved all issues.30  Each element has forced the courts to face
difficult, new questions.31
For example, plaintiffs will fall within the class of individuals that
Title VII protects only if they claimed that they were harassed because
of their gender.32 Conduct, however, need not be literally sexual in
nature to constitute sexual harassment; it is enough that it is motivated
by gender animus.33 A man or woman satisfies elements one and three
of the Hensen test by showing that they were harassed by a member of
the opposite sex because of their gender.34 In Oncale v. Sundower Off-
shore Services, however, the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment claim
26. For example, courts state that actionable harassment must be sufficiently “se-
vere or pervasive” to be actionable, and the words “severe or pervasive” do not appear in
the EEOC Guidelines. See id. at 65-67 (referring to both the EEOC Guidelines on Sex-
ual Harassment and the “severe or pervasive” requirement); see also Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that actionable harassment must be “severe or
pervasive”).
27. See Franklin, supra note 21, at 1533; Henson, 682 F.2d at 897.
28. Franklin, supra note 21, at 1527.
29. Id. at 1533.
30. Id. at 1528-48.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 1528.
33. Id. at 1532, 1533.
34. See id.
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against a person of the same gender.35  Although at first blush one
might wonder how a person of one sex could discriminate against an-
other person of the same sex on the basis of gender, the Supreme
Court has held that same-sex harassment claims are cognizable if the
evidence shows that the victim has indeed been targeted for harass-
ment because of his or her gender.36
Different courts have applied the second and fourth elements of
the Hensen test to similar situations with drastically different results.37
The disparate conclusions stem from the courts’ differing perceptions
concerning whether questionable behavior was actually gender-biased
and severe or pervasive enough to warrant awarding damages to a
plaintiff.38  Conduct that one person considers “merely juvenile” or tol-
erable because it is an accepted part of the workplace environment,
may be regarded as severely offensive and unacceptable to another
person.39  Courts have attempted to separate minor workplace teasing
and friction from actionable harassment by redressing only severe in-
stances of harassment.40
The requirement that the conduct be severe or pervasive enough
to alter the conditions of employment is a tough hurdle for plaintiffs
to clear.41  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court reiterated its
holding in Harris v. Forklift Systems that mere teasing, offhand com-
ments and isolated incidents of a trivial nature could not form the ba-
sis of a sexual harassment claim.42  Courts should “determine whether
an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive by ‘looking at all the
circumstances,’ including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory con-
duct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening . . . humiliating . . .
and unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work environment.’”43
A literal reading of the requirement that the harassment “alter the
condition of the victim’s employment” might suggest that a woman
who knowingly enters an abusive workplace cannot later use the abu-
sive conduct of the workplace culture as a basis for a sexual harassment
suit because the behavior was always present in the workplace and con-
35. See id.; Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
36. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
37. Compare, cases cited supra note 6, with cases cited supra note 7.
38. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
39. See Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (W.D.
Pa. 1993). 
40. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“offhand comments,
and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”).
41. See Franklin, supra note 21, at 1533-38.
42. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777, 787.
43. See id at 787.
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ditions never changed.  Many courts reject this reading and simply re-
quire that the conduct be severe or pervasive enough to intimidate the
employee or interfere with work performance.44 The Seventh Circuit
has expressly rejected the argument that a plaintiff “assumes the risk”
of working in a traditionally abusive workplace.45
Additionally, the Hensen test also requires the plaintiff to show
that he or she subjectively felt offended by the alleged harassment and
that an objective person would come to the same conclusion.46  The
perspective that should be taken when conducting the objective com-
ponent of this analysis is still a subject of controversy.47  Some courts
say that we should ask whether a reasonable person in similar circum-
stances would find the conduct objectionable.48  Other courts and le-
gal commentators advocate taking the perspective of a reasonable
woman when analyzing suspect conduct (reasonable man standard
when applicable).49  These courts and commentators believe that a
reasonable woman standard takes into account the fact that men and
women often perceive behavior differently.50  Still other scholars have
noted, however, that the reasonable woman standard is a double-edged
sword; it may force men to take women’s views into account, but it also
implies that women are fundamentally different from men, thereby
creating a basis for further discrimination.51   A 1999 psychological
study suggests that using a reasonable woman standard instead of a
reasonable person standard may have little actual impact on litiga-
44. See, e.g., cases cited, supra note 7.  In these cases the decisions do not protect
workplaces under the theory that plaintiffs assume the risk of harassment when enter-
ing work environments where objectionable, gender-biased conduct has traditionally
been present.  Instead, the courts focus on whether the plaintiff could reasonably re-
gard the alleged incidents of harassment as severe or pervasive enough to interfere with
his or her job performance or psychological well being.
45. Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an em-
ployee does not assume the risk of discriminatory conduct simply by choosing to work
in an environment where discriminatory behavior is prevalent).
46. See supra note 27.
47. Compare Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (a “reasonable person” standard applies in
sexual harassment cases), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (a gender-
based standard, such as “reasonable woman,” applies in sexual harassment cases).
48. See, e.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
49. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872; Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 611. (Keith, J., dissent-
ing); Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (quoting An-
drews, 895 F.2d at 1485-86); DEBORAH L. SIEGEL, LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT MUST BE BROAD, IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 143, 147-48 (Bender et al., 1992).
50. See supra note 49.
51. See Robert Unikel, Reasonable Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard
in American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 331 (1992).
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tion.52  The study found that men and women seem to define their
respective notions of sexual harassment with little consideration for
the particular legal standard employed by courts.53
Even if a plaintiff manages to satisfy all of the other elements, he
or she must still establish that the employer is liable for the conduct.54
The Supreme Court has held that in cases of quid pro quo harassment
by a supervisor, an employer is strictly liable because the supervisor is
deemed to have acted as the agent of the employer.55 When a supervi-
sor takes sex-based tangible employment action against an employee,
the Supreme Court has held that it is proper to hold the employer
liable because the supervisor’s tortious actions were aided directly by
the power of the agency relationship with the employer.56  If a co-
worker sexually harasses another employee, however, the employer is
not automatically liable because the co-worker is not empowered to
take tangible employment action and, therefore, is not necessarily
aided by the power of an agency relationship with the employer.57  In
cases involving co-worker harassment, courts are instructed to look at
general agency law principles to determine if an employer must be
held accountable for co-worker harassment.58
The Supreme Court has since announced another rule to be ap-
plied when a supervisor, rather than a co-worker, is accused of creating
a sexually hostile workplace without actually taking tangible employ-
ment action against an employee.59  Currently, an employer is strictly
liable for damages arising from hostile workplace environment sexual
harassment claims involving supervisors unless the employer can over-
come this presumption by using a newly promulgated affirmative de-
fense.60  An employer can avoid or reduce liability for a hostile
workplace environment sexual harassment claim if the employer can
show that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and (2) the plaintiff
52. See Gutek, et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y. & L. 596, 623-26 (1999).
53. See Id. at 623.
54. See generally, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.61
An examination of cases that apply these elements to real-world
situations reveals the types of specific behavior that might constitute
actionable hostile workplace environment sexual harassment.  In An-
drews v. City of Philadelphia, the court held that “the pervasive use of
derogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and ad-
dressed to female employees personally might serve as evidence of a
hostile work environment.”62  Other courts, however, have declined to
brand sexually-tinged vulgarities as harassment when defendants have
demonstrated that plaintiffs “welcomed” vulgarity by using it in the
workplace themselves.63
Some courts state that exposure to pornography in the workplace
can be classified as sexual harassment.  Other courts have rejected this
notion and concluded that pornography is something that our society
generally tolerates; therefore, a reasonable person would not find
“girlie magazines” objectionable.64  Even unwanted touching of a sex-
ual nature is not certain to guarantee a victory for the plaintiff.65
Again, courts have differed as to the number and types of incidents
necessary to support a hostile workplace environment claim.66  Ulti-
61. See id.
62. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1487 (3d Cir. 1990).
63. See Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (plaintiff’s claim dismissed, partly because plaintiff also used foul language);
Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315 (D.N.J. 1983)
(plaintiff’s claim dismissed, partly because plaintiff also used foul language). But see
Swentek v. USAIR, 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir.1987) (plaintiff’s consensual use of foul
language does not constitute a waiver of legal protection against unwelcome
harassment).
64. Compare Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620-21 (exposure to pornographic materials is
not actionable harassment), with Jensen, 130 F.3d at 1292 (exposure to pornographic
materials can be considered as evidence of sexual harassment).
65. See Franklin, supra note 21, at 1538.
66. See, e.g., Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that several attempts to kiss plaintiff combined with several sexual ad-
vances insufficient to state a sexual harassment claim); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co.,
50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding several instances of sexually-tinged, offensive be-
havior including one instance of feigned masturbation insufficiently severe or pervasive
to constitute a claim); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353 (7th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that several sexual jokes aimed at plaintiff combined with the fact that co-workers
repeatedly stared at her breasts and once touched her buttocks insufficiently severe to
support a claim); Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that sexual propositions and repeated touching of buttocks and thighs suffi-
cient to state an actionable claim); Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding sufficient evidence to support a claim where plaintiff alleged supervisor
looked at plaintiff’s breasts and made several vulgar, sexually demeaning comments);
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mately, the sense one gets from the cases is that sexual harassment can
be visual, tactile or verbal in nature, but that specific determinations
often depend upon a particular court’s view of the conduct and the
circumstances surrounding it.67
In fact, before 1991 specific determinations depended solely on
the courts’ view of the alleged harassment because there were no jury
trials for these types of cases prior to that date.68  The Civil Rights Act
of 1991 added the right to jury trials because of the perception that the
male-dominated federal judiciary lacked the gender diversity and real-
world experience of a jury, and that these qualities were necessary to
decide hostile workplace sexual harassment claims fairly.69
The discussion in this section has set forth the current state of sex
discrimination law in the sexual harassment context.  The next section
will examine how courts have considered workplace culture evidence
when determining whether a plaintiff’s work environment is actionably
hostile.
II. THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE CULTURE ON HOSTILE WORKPLACE
ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION:
SPECIFIC CASES
Case law suggests that workplace culture may be defined as a set of
standard practices and mores that have been traditionally identified
with workers of specific industries and workplaces.70 Many cases explic-
itly refer to workplace culture when analyzing hostile workplace envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims, but not all courts regard workplace
culture in the same manner.  Some courts have concluded that tradi-
tionally accepted workplace behavior cannot be classified as actionable
sexual harassment.71  Other courts expressly reject the idea that indus-
Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1998) (sufficient where defendant
intentionally brushed up against plaintiff and stated “that he was going to get her” and
harassed other female employees); see also cases cited supra notes 6 & 7.
67. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
68. See 42 U.S.C. 1981a (c) (1994); infra note 69.
69. Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litiga-
tion in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F.  277, 298 (1999) (“ Because very few
women . . .have been appointed to the federal judiciary . . .jury trial proponents were
well aware that [male judges] decided sex discrimination cases.  [However] federal law
as well as the Constitution, assures that a civil jury would include men and women with
a wide range of experiences and perspectives.  Congress could sensibly conclude that a
jury . . .  would bring an invaluable understanding of workplace realities, of the nuances
. . .  of gender relations, and of the complexities of human motivation.”).
70. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
71. See cases cited supra note 6.
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tries and individual workplaces can define sexual harassment accord-
ing to their own practices.72  Often, these “accepted” workplace
practices could reasonably be regarded as discriminatory sexual harass-
ment.73  Additionally, a court’s statements about the level of deference
workplace culture should receive in sexual harassment litigation can
still be disturbing even when a particular case is weak from any
perspective.74
First, we will examine cases that have allowed abusive gender-bi-
ased workplace cultures to negate hostile workplace environment sex-
ual harassment claims.  In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., the plaintiff
alleged that one of her male co-workers routinely made denigrating
comments about women in general.75  Sometimes these comments
were specifically directed towards her.76  The plaintiff also indicated
that other female employees were affected by this co-worker’s behav-
ior.77  Furthermore, the plaintiff complained that male co-workers dis-
played pictures of “nude and scantily clad women in their offices and/
or work areas, to which the plaintiff and other women employees were
exposed.”78  The Tenth Circuit court affirmed the district court’s judg-
ment for the defendant.79  The circuit court quoted the district court
in saying that “[i]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work envi-
ronments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.  Sexual
jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound.  Title VII
was not meant to –or can- change this.”80  The Rabidue court also
stated that “the lexicon of obscenities that pervaded the environment
of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff’s introduction into
its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff
72. See cases cited supra note 7.
73. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
74. See, e.g., Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).  Here the court implied that women could not complain about sexual comments
in the securities trading firm because these comments were an accepted part of the
workplace culture without considering that severe or pervasive “sexual commentary”
might reasonably be seen by women as sexual harassment.  However, the plaintiff in this
case probably would have lost anyway because there was little evidence that she was
subjectively offended by the comments.
75. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 615.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 623.
80. Id. at 620-21.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-1-2\NLR105.txt unknown Seq: 13 10-FEB-03 14:47
2002-2003] DOES TITLE VII MEAN NEW MANAGEMENT? 361
upon voluntarily entering the environment,” must be considered.81
Thus, the court implied that a plaintiff could not claim that conduct
was  discriminatory sexual harassment if it was  an established part of a
workplace culture, and the plaintiff should have known that he or she
would be exposed to it after accepting an offer of employment.
Judge Keith, dissenting in part from the Rabidue majority, stated
that the evidence was sufficiently anti-female to support a hostile envi-
ronment claim.82  The plaintiff established that her co-worker regu-
larly referred to women as “whores,” “cunt,” “pussy,” and “tits.”  “One
poster. . . showed a prone women who had a golf ball on her breasts
with a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling “fore”.83  Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff was also subjected to remarks such as, “[a]ll that
bitch needs is a good lay,” and “fat ass.”84  Finally, the plaintiff’s em-
ployer prevented her from having luncheon meetings with male clients
because the employer felt it was improper for a married woman to
have lunch with other men.85  The company, however, allowed mar-
ried men to meet female clients for lunch.86  This disparate treatment
was additional evidence that the workplace environment was biased
against women.  After citing these incidents, Judge Keith stated the fol-
lowing: “In my view, Title VII’s precise purpose is to prevent such be-
havior from poisoning the work environment of classes protected
under the Act.  To condone the majority’s notion of the ‘prevailing
workplace’ I would also have to agree that if an employer maintains an
anti-Semitic workforce . . . a Jewish employee assumes the risk of work-
ing there, and a court must consider such a work environment as
‘prevailing.’”87
Many courts have rejected the reasoning of the majority in
Rabidue.88  Yet, despite heavy criticism, Rabidue has not disappeared.
Recently, the court in Wieland v. Indiana Department of Transportation,
made the following comment that smacks of Rabidue’s reasoning: “Title
VII was not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity, for a certain
amount of vulgar banter tinged with sexual innuendo is inevitable in
81. Id. at 620.
82. Id. at 623.




87. Id. at 626.
88. See cases cited supra note 7.
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the modern workplace.”89 This comment leaves us  wondering exactly
what types of sexually-tinged vulgarities will be excluded from consid-
eration in a sexual harassment suit, as well as when and how often an
employee is expected to endure these potentially gender-biased
vulgarities.
In Gross v. Burggraf Construction Company, a female plaintiff alleged
that her supervisor verbally harassed her by repeatedly calling her
“dumb”, and once telling her to get her “ass” back into a work truck.90
Additionally, on one occasion the plaintiff was having trouble commu-
nicating with her supervisor over a CB radio.91 Her frustrated supervi-
sor turned toward a male worker and said: “Mark, sometimes don’t you
just want to smash a woman in the face?”92  The plaintiff overheard this
comment because it was broadcast over the radio.93  The Court held
that the words “dumb” and “ass” are gender neutral and cannot sup-
port a hostile workplace sexual harassment claim, and that the com-
ment made over the radio was an isolated incident which was
insufficient to show severe and pervasive harassment.94
Yet, even assuming that the Gross court correctly analyzed the
claim, the court, in dicta, went beyond the particular facts of the case
and made sweeping comments about the weight that the workplace
culture should generally play in sexual harassment cases.95  First, the
court cited Rabidue with approval.96  Secondly, the court stated “that in
the real world of construction work profanity and vulgarity are not per-
ceived as hostile or abusive” and that the plaintiff’s claim must be ana-
lyzed “in the context of a blue-collar environment.”97  The court
89. 98 F. Supp 2d. 1009, 1018 (2000) (quoting Gleason v. Mesirow Financial, Inc.,
118 F.3d 1134, 1144 (1997)). See also Connor v. Schrader - Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227
F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) (overturning district court’s ruling that alleged incidents of
sexual harassment were not actionable because they occurred in the “rugged environ-
ment” of a machine shop); Smith v. Sheahan, No. 95-C-7203, at 23 (N.D. Ill. 1997),
rev’d, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999) (ruling that violence was common amongst co-work-
ers in the jail setting and that no sexual harassment occurred when a male employee
physically assaulted a female co-worker, called her a “bitch” and threatened to “fuck
[her] up”).
90. 53 F.3d 1531, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 1542.
92. Id. at 1535.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1542, 1543.
95. Id. at 1537, 1538.
96. Id. at 1538.
97. Id. at 1539.
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implied that no reasonable construction worker could have ever re-
garded any type of vulgarity as sexual harassment because vulgarity
was, stereotypically, considered an accepted part of the construction
industry.  Thus, a woman who chooses to work in a “blue-collar” envi-
ronment like the construction industry might be forced to endure vul-
gar statements like those found in Rabidue without any recourse.
Another example of a sexually hostile workplace afforded judicial
protection is seen in Hosey v. Mcdonalds.98  In this case, the plaintiff was
a young male who alleged that he suffered psychological injury be-
cause a female co-worker pinched his buttocks on 10 occasions, made
repeated requests for dates and made numerous sexually oriented
comments, such as “she would like to know what it felt like to have me
inside her.”99  The plaintiff reported this activity to management, but
since there was no indication that the complaints were taken seriously,
the plaintiff left his position and brought a hostile workplace environ-
ment sexual harassment claim under Title VII.100  The district court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment, holding that the
alleged incidents of sexual touching were not severe or pervasive and
that “a court must consider the plaintiff’s work environment.  Here, it
is common for teenagers to ask each other out on dates and unfortu-
nately, to use unprofessional language.”101  The appellate court up-
held this judgment.102
Although the rulings in some sexual harassment cases shield op-
pressive conduct when it is considered a normal part of a particular
workplace or industry, other courts expressly reject this notion.103  In
Bennett v. NYC Department of Corrections, the plaintiff, a prison guard,
claimed that her co-workers subjected her to a sexually hostile work
environment.104  She alleged the following incidents in support of this
contention: (1) a co-worker once called her a “bitch”; (2) another co-
worker repeatedly asked her out; (3) twice she was subjected to humor
that, arguably, had an implied sexual connotation; (4) a Deputy War-
den asked her to sit on his lap once; (5) twice plaintiff found obscene
graffiti on the walls that was directed towards her; and (6) she once
98. 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 201 (D. Md. 1996).
99. Id. at 202.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 203.
102. Hosey v. McDonalds, 113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997).
103. See cases cited supra notes 6-7.
104. 705 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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overheard a conversation between two prison guards that referenced a
sexual experience with a prostitute.105  The court refused to dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint and stated that “prisons are coarse and rowdy
. . . but that does not mean anything goes, particularly among those
that are charged with maintaining discipline of the staff . . . there are
limits beyond which even the atmosphere of a prison may not be al-
lowed to deteriorate.”106  Here, the court recognized that conduct
could still amount to discriminatory sexual harassment despite the
prevalence of the conduct within a specific workplace or industry.
In Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, the plaintiff alleged that her co-
workers were taking bets on the color of her underwear and that her
employer directed sexually-tinged comments toward her.107 In re-
jecting a “boys will be boys” defense, the court replied, “We realize that
there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we
believe that many women share concerns that men do not necessarily
share,” and, “[M]en, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social
setting or the underlying threat of violence a woman may perceive.”108
Rather than insulate conduct from scrutiny simply because of its preva-
lence in a specific workplace, the court indicated that the perspective
of the victim must be taken into account.109  The court noted that the
Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have adopted a “reasonable
woman” standard to accomplish this goal.110
In Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., the court found that the Eveleth
mining company was “male-dominated in terms of power, position and
atmosphere,” and that Eveleth’s male employees lashed out at female
employees with sexual harassment in all its forms.111  Pornographic
materials saturated the work environment.112  Female workers re-
counted incidents involving unwelcome “kissing, pinching and grab-
bing,” and reported that male workers frequently used offensive
language aimed at women.113  Furthermore, male employees told their
female counterparts that they belonged at home with their children,
105. Id. at 984, 986.
106. Id. at 986 (quoting Snell v. County of Suffolk, 782 F.2d. 1094 (2d Cir. 1986)).
107. 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
108. See id. at 1359.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1291.
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not working in the mines.114  The district court special master found
that the culture of the Iron Range mining industry historically toler-
ated sexual harassment and that this should count as a mitigating fac-
tor for Eveleth Mines.115  The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that
Eveleth’s responsibility was underscored by the fact that it tolerated
sexual harassment along with the rest of the mining industry.116
The cases reveal that workplace culture evidence can impact the
outcome of hostile workplace environment sexual harassment
claims.117  One line of reasoning suggests an employee must simply
tolerate gender-biased and abusive conduct when it is a prevailing
component of the workplace.118  Another perspective discounts this
line of reasoning, and instead suggests that the propriety of workplace
behavior depends upon a more complex analysis that takes the per-
spective of the victim into account.119
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR CONSIDERING EVIDENCE OF A
GENDER-BIASED WORKPLACE CULTURE IN HOSTILE
WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LITIGATION
Conduct should not automatically be legitimized merely because
it is an accepted part of a particular workplace or industry.120  Title VII
promised to open industries to persons of both genders, and courts
have concluded that Title VII prohibits sexual harassment because it
can be used as a tool to drive one gender out of specific employment
settings or make it more difficult for them to perform their jobs.121
For example, if certain behavior that reasonable women would regard
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1292.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6-7.
118. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
119. See, e.g., Atwood v. Biondi Mitsubishi, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1357
(W.D. Pa. 1993).
120. See id.; Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 611 (Keith, J. dissenting).
121. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627 (Keith, J., dissenting) (concluding that sexual pos-
ters and anti-female language can seriously affect the psychological well-being of rea-
sonable women and interfere with their job performance);  Sandy Welsh & James
Gruber, Not Taking It Any More: Women Who Report or File Complaints of Sexual Harassment,
36:4 THE CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 559 (1999) (containing
survey finding that severe sexual harassment can prompt women to quit their jobs); see
also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“Surely, a requirement that a
man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being al-
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as sexual harassment is allowed to persist in a workplace simply be-
cause of its prevalence, women may leave positions in these settings to
avoid abuse, or their work performance may suffer because of psycho-
logical stress.122  This serves to undermine the policy behind Title VII
by effectively giving individual businesses and industries the ability to
tolerate, or even foster, workplace cultures that are gender-biased with-
out incurring any liability.123
If we rely on workplace culture as a conclusive method for evaluat-
ing conduct, we are also left with a rather perverse implication.  The
law would afford greater protection to businesses where sexual harass-
ment occurs regularly than to companies where sexual harassment oc-
curs with so much less frequency that it cannot be considered a
dominant part of the workplace culture.124 Businesses could avoid lia-
bility for gender-biased, objectionable conduct simply by making it a
“normal” part of the workplace.  Conversely, employers that work hard
to maintain harassment-free workplaces could face liability for similar
incidents of sexual harassment precisely because they did not allow
sexual harassment to become a customary part of the workplace.
The better approach gives greater weight to the viewpoint of the
victim and less to the nature of the workplace culture.125  We must
consider whether someone in the plaintiff’s position could reasonably
consider the behavior accepted within a particular workplace culture
as sexual harassment.126  Again, scholars and courts continue to disa-
gree about how we should take the victim’s perspective into account
when analyzing hostile workplace environment sexual harassment
claims.127 Whether the appropriate legal standard for considering the
lowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest
of racial epithets.”).
122. See supra note 121.
123. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626  (Keith, J. dissenting) (“. . . unless the outlook of a
reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to
sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders. . . the
majority suggests that [women] assume the risk of working in an abusive, anti-female
environment. . . . In my view, Title VII’s precise purpose is to prevent such behavior . . .
from poisoning the work environment.”).
124. Rabidue implies that while conduct alleged to be sexual harassment must oc-
cur frequently to be actionable, once the conduct surpasses a certain level of pervasive-
ness, it can become part of a “prevailing workplace environment” that the plaintiff must
endure. 805 F.2d at 611.
125. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
126. See id.
127. See supra notes 50-52.
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victim’s perspective is gender-neutral (reasonable person or victim
standard) or gender-sensitive (reasonable woman or man standard),128
jurors should have the ability to decide that a plaintiff reasonably re-
garded conduct as actionable sexual harassment even when that con-
duct is a dominant part of the workplace culture.129
This is not to say, however, that workplace norms are irrelevant in
hostile workplace environment sexual harassment litigation.  Work-
place cultures provide a context for evaluating sexual harassment
claims.130 Information about an allegedly gender-biased workplace cul-
ture can help judges and juries understand whether women or men
have been intentionally, pervasively or severely harassed within a par-
ticular workplace.131  Evidence of a gender-biased, abusive workplace
culture tends to support a plaintiff’s hostile workplace environment
sexual harassment claim.  For instance, a workplace filled with harass-
ment that is purposefully designed to discriminate on the basis of gen-
der, or takes a form that is especially likely to cause psychological
injury, will warrant an increased damage award.132  Furthermore, evi-
dence that a workplace culture is contaminated by sex-based discrimi-
nation might help plaintiffs prove the “severe and pervasive” element
of a hostile workplace environment sexual harassment claim.133
If a plaintiff can show that a particular workplace environment is
so heavily polluted with sexual harassment that it forms a part of the
dominant workplace culture and the employer failed to take action, it
may give rise to the inference that the employer purposely encouraged
or recklessly ignored instances of sexual harassment.134  Although a
128. See supra note 127.
129. See generally Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878; Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J.
dissenting).
130. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).  Harris instructed courts to
consider all the circumstances when evaluating a hostile workplace environment sexual
harassment claim.  This would include a consideration of the plaintiff’s work environ-
ment, but many courts have not interpreted Harris to mean that the work environment
must be tolerated under any circumstances. See also cases cited supra note 7.
131. See infra notes 134, 136-37 and accompanying text.
132. See id.
133. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
134. See Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1997).  In
Jensen, the court found that sexual harassment was so pervasive in the mining company
that the employer must have been aware of its existence. It is no stretch to say that a
reasonable fact-finder might interpret this to mean that the employer callously disre-
garded or approved of the harassment.  When an employer intentionally or recklessly
violates Title VII, plaintiffs may bring claims for punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C
§ 1981(a) (1991).
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plaintiff need not show that an employer intentionally fostered a dis-
criminatory environment, this fact may underscore the culpability of
the employer and make punitive damages more appropriate.135  In
contrast, if an employer tried unsuccessfully, but in good faith, to re-
spond to complaints of widespread harassment, a plaintiff’s damage
award should properly exclude punitive damages.136
Plaintiffs might also use workplace culture evidence to show that
the prevalent behavior in a certain workplace was especially likely to
cause psychological distress and negatively affect their job perform-
ance.137  According to a recent Canadian psychological study, an em-
ployee who is subjected to very severe sexual harassment, harassment
by multiple harassers, or both quid pro quo and hostile workplace sexual
harassment may be more likely to suffer adverse employment and psy-
chological consequences than victims exposed to other forms of sexual
harassment.138  Thus, there is statistical evidence that plaintiffs work-
ing in environments where these forms of harassment exist may have
greater damages as compared with plaintiffs that have been exposed to
other forms or levels of sexual harassment.139
Plaintiffs could also use evidence of an abusive workplace culture
to show that harassment pervaded the work environment.  Unless se-
vere, only pervasive incidents of sexual harassment are actionable;
therefore, the courts will not redress merely episodic occurrences.140
A plaintiff might produce evidence tending to show that employees of
one gender are routinely targeted for harassment.141 This may be im-
portant in cases where a plaintiff’s claim could be viewed by some as
135. See supra note 134.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a ) (1991) (punitive damages available when an employer
intentionally or recklessly creates a hostile working environment).
137. A study of Canadian women found that women experience adverse psycholog-
ical and job consequences as a result of sexual harassment especially if it was severe or
involved either several people or several forms of sexual harassment. See Welsh & Gru-
ber, supra note 121 (“women experience adverse outcomes as a result of [sexual harass-
ment], especially if it was severe or involved either several people or several forms of
[sexual harassment]”).  These findings imply that a plaintiff exposed to an environment
where these specific forms of harassment exist, might be entitled to greater damage
awards than victims of other forms of actionable harassment.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
141. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir.
1995) (noting that the prevailing work atmosphere, including evidence that other men
or women were harassed, may be considered in evaluating a [hostile workplace environ-
ment sexual harassment] claim so long as the plaintiff was aware of the harassment).
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pervasive, and others as episodic.  For example, a plaintiff who claims
he or she was personally subjected to four or five instances of verbal
harassment during a one year period might have a better chance of
proving that sexual harassment pervaded the environment if he or she
could show that they knew other similarly situated employees who ex-
perienced sexual harassment.142
Only under very limited circumstances should employers be al-
lowed to maintain seemingly gender-biased workplaces without an in-
quiry into the effect that the environment has on employees.  Title VII
excuses the employer from liability if the employer can show that the
allegedly gender-biased harassment is a bona fide requirement of the
occupation.143  For example, a person who worked for a magazine
company as a salesperson could not object to the fact that he or she
was exposed to copies of adult magazines, if those magazines were sold
by the company.144
Employers can also escape liability in hostile workplace environ-
ment sexual harassment cases involving supervisors if they can show
that they acted reasonably to prevent and correct gender-biased behav-
ior and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of these
measures.145  In fairness, an employer should be allowed to introduce
evidence that the workplace culture has been traditionally free from
sexual harassment to help prove it responded reasonably to complaints
of harassment.  For example, an employer might indicate that only a
few incidents of sexual harassment occurred at the company over the
past decade and that they were all resolved promptly by speaking with
the offenders.  The employer can now argue that with so few incidents
of harassment it was sufficient to promulgate a sexual harassment pol-
icy and respond to complaints as they were filed because there was no
reason to believe that more extreme measures, such as extensive
mandatory training programs, were necessary.146
Of course, a plaintiff always has the opportunity to rebut the em-
ployer’s characterization of the workplace culture and instead offer evi-
dence that the employer knew or should have been aware of
widespread sexual harassment within the environment and that merely
142. See id.
143. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1994).
144. See id.
145. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
146. See id. The court even implies that a formal anti-sexual harassment policy is
not always necessary to show that an employer acted reasonably.
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having a sexual harassment policy was insufficient.147  In some environ-
ments, an employer might be required to actively question its
workforce to determine the scope of a sexual harassment problem,
and might even have to institute mandatory sensitivity training for its
employees.148
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace.  Although
some courts undermine Title VII by condoning gender-biased conduct
when it is a dominant part of a workplace culture, other courts reject
this notion and instead ask if the victim could have reasonably re-
garded the conduct as sexual harassment despite its prevalence within
the workplace.  Plaintiffs should be able to use evidence of a gender-
biased workplace culture to help prove their hostile workplace envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims.  Workplace culture evidence can
help jurors and judges to understand whether employers intentionally
promote or condone sexual harassment.  Furthermore, workplace cul-
ture evidence can help a plaintiff prove that sexual harassment per-
vaded a particular work environment, as well as the damages that he or
she likely suffered as a result of such an environment.  The legal stan-
dards that govern hostile workplace environment sexual harassment
claims must be interpreted so that Title VII’s underlying policy is
served in the fairest possible manner to both employers and employ-
ees.  Businesses and industries, however, should not be able to escape
liability and perpetuate injustice simply by calling sexual harassment a
dominant part of the workplace culture.
Christopher Massaro
147. See, e.g., Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 292 (8th Cir. 1997)
(employer did nothing to stop widespread sexual harassment within company).
148. See id.  Jensen depicts a situation where an employer would probably have to do
much more than simply promulgate an anti-harassment policy before a judge or jury
could conclude that the employer acted reasonably.
